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1. Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the intensive expansionary process of mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) of bank holding companies (BHCs) in the U.S. banking system. BHCs
have recently attracted attention from policymakers and researchers because of their systemic
importance1. From the viewpoint of systemic risk, stable funding and liquidity management
are factors of importance. A bank that relies on less stable funding is more likely to fail2. For
these reasons, the Basel committee proposed a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) regulation
that will be implemented in 2021. However, the manners in which banks manage these ratios
have been under-researched.
The essential factors of bank regulation act at best to serve the interests of depositors,
investors and academic researchers in the financial markets. This study aims to investi-
gate multi-bank holding companies (MBHCs) management of funding liquidity risk due to
a number of important reasons. First, funding liquidity is defined as the ease with which
an institution can obtain funding (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). When a bank funds
long-term illiquid assets with short-term debts, it is more likely to become unable to roll over
borrowing during a financial crisis (Brunnermeier 2009, Diamond and Rajan 2009, Afonso
et al. 2011, Acharya and Merrouche 2013). Banks must manage the risk arising from such
funding liquidity by reducing illiquid assets or increasing stable sources of funding. MBHCs
are different from stand-alone banks and banks in single-bank holding companies in their liq-
uidity management because MBHCs have internal liquidity markets3. Understanding MBHC
and non-MBHC structure could provide better insight into the liquidity risk of banks faced
by depositors. Second, Ly et al. (2017b) find that targets that are acquired by MBHC af-
filiates are smaller and have to hold higher capital. If the economic rationale underpinning
1For example, see Cetorelli et al. (2014).
2See Bologna (2015) and Vazquez and Federico (2015) for empirical analyses.
3We call stand-alone banks and banks in single-bank holding companies non-MBHC banks hereafter.
the M&As wave of banks outside the MBHC structure is indeed due to internal liquidity
markets, this thereby increases the banks ability to withstand a crisis. Hence, such a derived
concept could help investors with making the right decisions on their investment portfolios.
Third, Ly et al. (2017a) find that if one BHC does not attempt to adjust funding risk
quickly, this causes the joint probability of all BHCs to experience a liquidity shortfall si-
multaneously, which in turn increases systemic risk. Given the ever-increasing complexity of
the BHC structure, academic researchers (Allahrakha et al. 2015, Huang et al. 2012) were
attracted to estimate the measures to assess the systemic importance of BHCs and their risk
contribution to the entire banking system. Our study, therefore, could draw their attention
regarding the funding liquidity risk and expansionary process that could be the observable
factors of BHCs systemic risk. Last, but not least, this paper is written at a time of signicant
Basel III reform of liquidity. The decision of a bank manager to enter an MBHC during this
transition period could provide an insight into the regulatory implication. Hence, our study
contributes to a closer supervisory practice to identify the liquidity problem of MBHCs and
the proposed determinants of Basel III liquidity standard in terms of bank structure.
As Carletti et al. (2007) argued, internal liquidity markets enable MBHC members to
reshuﬄe their funding liquidity. MBHC members can diversify funding liquidity risk while
they can also internalize the external benefits of holding liquidity. When an MBHC member
can diversify funding liquidity risk, it does not need to hold more liquidity than other non-
MBHC banks. When it can internalize the benefits of the liquidity needs of other member
banks, it holds more liquidity than other non-MBHC banks because holding liquidity is
more valuable. We call the former the diversification effect hypothesis and the latter the
internalization effect hypothesis. Our empirical analyses examine which hypothesis holds in
various ways.
Using quarterly data for U.S. commercial banks from 1995 to 2011, our primary analysis
provides supportive evidence for the diversification effect. In other words, the diversification
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effect dominates the internalization effect in the internal liquidity market of MBHCs. MBHC
members hold less liquidity than non-MBHC banks because liquidity needs are expected to
be smaller than others. This finding is consistent with the argument that the threat to the
U.S. financial stability is mainly due to unstable funding profiles of complex BHCs (Federal
Register 2016). The other results are summarized as follows: (i) the dominance of the
diversification effect persists for at least two years; (ii) the diversification effect hypothesis
also holds for alternative traditional measurements of liquidity; (iii) the scant liquidity of
MBHCs is accompanied by lower funding costs than that of non-MBHC banks; (iv) the
effects of the funding liquidity of banks entering/leaving an MBHC spreads to other existing
members; (v) this effect is U-shaped regarding the number of MBHC members; and (vi) the
diversification effect hypothesis holds regardless of the type of merger that a BHC chooses.
Our paper contributes to the extant literature as follows. First, despite the importance of
the theoretical work of Carletti et al. (2007), we have seen little empirical evidence regarding
MBHCs liquidity risk management (Berger and Bouwman 2009, Ellul and Yerramilli 2013).
Our study is the first to provide empirical evidence on the diversification effect in liquidity
usage, which explains how internal liquidity markets work in MBHCs and the benefits that
member banks could enjoy4.
Second, we contribute to the growing literature on Basel III liquidity regulations (King
2013, Distinguin et al. 2013, Haan and van den End 2013, Hong et al. 2014, Schmaltz et
al. 2014, Vazquez and Federico 2015, DeYoung and Jang 2016). DeYoung and Jang (2016)
found a size effect in liquidity management. As banks increase in size, they set lower liquidity
4Berger and Bouwman (2009) found that large banks, MBHC members, retail banks, and recently merged
banks created the most liquidity. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) argued that large BHCs are better diversified
than small BHCs based on market measurements of diversification. Hughes et al. (1999) found that the
economic benefits of consolidation are strongest for banks engaged in interstate expansion and, in particular,
interstate expansion that diversifies banks macroeconomic risk. Campello (2002) found that stand-alone
banks face more financial constraints than BHC subsidiaries during money contraction because stand-alone
banks loan growth tends to rely more on their own cash flow, while the internal capital market within BHCs
decreases the sensitivity of loan growth to the cash flows of subsidiaries.
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targets. Our results are robust in the sense that MBHC members hold lower liquidity after
controlling for size effects. In other words, MBHC members benefit more from holding scant
liquidity than non-MBHC banks of the same size because the former can diversify funding
liquidity risk more efficiently through internal liquidity markets than the latter.
Third, our study is closely related to a large body of bank consolidation literature
(Rhoades 1993, 1998, Calomiris 1999, Focarelli and Panetta 2003, Amel et al. 2004, Craig
and Dinger 2009, Deng et al. 2013, Dinger 2015)5. Among them, Craig and Dinger (2009)
noted that the banking literature has not reached a consensus on the impact of bank mergers
on deposit rates. Our analysis adds new evidence to the literature. The structure of MBHCs
allows their subsidiary banks to save funding costs. This finding is also consistent with the
evidence that when liquidity dries up, banks experience funding inflows, as argued in Gatev
and Strahan (2006). They argued that banks can provide firms with insurance when firms
face market-wide liquidity shocks in the commercial paper market since they seek safe haven
for their wealth. We extend their rationale to emphasize the unique ability of MBHC struc-
ture to hedge against systematic liquidity shocks by conserving their liquidity needs with
lower costs.
Fourth, our results have direct implications for upcoming NSFR regulations. Large BHCs
suffered the most serious losses among the various financial intermediaries. Indeed, these huge
losses drove the argument for the tightening of bank regulation6. The NSFR regulation is
designed to reduce the funding risk arising from the mismatch between assets and liabilities.
5See Rhoades (1998) and Amel et al. (2004) for the classic works in the literature. Calomiris (1999) argued
that bank consolidation waves produce substantial efficiency gains associated with reduced operating costs
and the enrichment of bank-customer relationships. Successful banks that are highlighted in his study, for
example, Nations Bank and US Bancorp, are called “universal banking American-style” and are structured
as BHCs to serve as a platform for customer relationships through a variety of separate corporate entities.
Calormiris (1999) emphasized that analyses of the motives underlying merger activity are valuable in de-
termining the efficiency consequences of mergers. Deng et al. (2013) suggested that BHCs pursue multiple
dimensions of diversification, such as geographic, revenue, non-traditional activity and asset diversification,
at the same time. Ly et al. (2017) found that BHCs tend to adjust the NSFR quickly in response to the
Basel III liquidity requirement, hence reducing systemic risk.
6Frankel (2013) provided a good illustration of the problems that large BHCs pose to the financial system.
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From this perspective, our findings of scant liquidity in the internal markets of MBHCs
suggest that the structure of MBHCs was fragile in their liquidity funding risk, providing the
rationale for the strict liquidity regulations for MBHCs. Since MBHCs have less available
stable funds relative to their required counterparts or they have more required funds relative
to their available funds, sooner or later, the mismatch risks become apparent. Although
we interpret that low NSFRs arise from diversification effects, it might suggest that MBHC
members have low NSFRs because they recognize themselves as “too-big-to-fail”7.
Our evidence suggests that the large MBHCs enjoyed scant liquidity at the cost of mis-
match risk. Hence, upcoming regulations distort the efficient workings of the internal liquidity
market of MBHCs. The regulator should introduce a penalty if MBHCs distort the internal
liquidity market to mitigate the mismatch risk. It is more costly for MBHC banks to achieve
the target NSFR than for non-MBHC banks. Another concern is that facing the required
compliance with the NSFR standards in 2021 (Federal register 2016), banks might arbitrage
their liquidity by acquiring banks with high NSFRs, particularly during stress periods. On
the one hand, such acquisition reduces the regulatory burden. On the other hand, it re-
duces the effectiveness of NSFR regulations because this arbitrage does not change aggregate
liquidity.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the baseline and extended
hypothesis. Section 3 describes our data sets, provides summary statistics, and explains our
econometric methodology. Section 4 provides empirical evidence. Section 5 summarizes our
conclusions.
7However, Hong et al. (2014) argued that the NSFR has limited effects on bank failures, but the systemic
liquidity risk was a major contributor to bank failures in 2009 and 2010.
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2. Hypothesis development
The regulation of the NSFR that measures funding liquidity risk is designed to promote
more stable funding of more illiquid assets. BCBS (2014) defines the NSFR as the ratio
of the available amount of stable funding (ASF) divided by the required amount of stable
funding (RSF)8. Since the weight for a class of asset in RSF is higher as the class becomes
more illiquid, RSF is greater as the composition of bank assets becomes more illiquid. Since
the weight for a class of liabilities in ASF is higher as the class becomes more stable, ASF
is higher as the composition of bank liabilities becomes more stable. Hence, the NSFR is
higher as bank assets become more liquid, and the funding becomes more stable9.
2.1. Funding liquidity effects in MBHCs: Diversification and internalization
Avraham et al. (2012) define a BHC as a corporation controlling one or more banks on the
basis of ownership of all or part of banks equity. In particular, single-bank holding company
owns one bank. By contrast, an MBHC is a group of separately incorporated banks sharing
a common corporate ownership and their managements are associated closely with that of a
lead bank (Kane, 1996). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999 allowed MBHCs to engage in a
wide range of activities beyond traditional banking businesses (Lopez-Espinosa et al., 2012).
Therefore, MBHCs have had more opportunities to diversify into non-traditional banking
activities. The legislation has highlighted non-traditional powers and geographic advantages
for an MBHC structure and resulted in banking companies that were larger and more complex
than non-MBHC banks. Such nonbank expansion may increase risk and, therefore, indirectly
have an influence on the safety and soundness of the banking system.
MBHCs create their internal markets to exchange certain classes of asset, liability, and
capital. For example, in the internal capital market, conglomerates can provide subsidiaries
8If RSF is higher than ASF, banks are exposed to the risk of selling assets at fire sale prices to repay the
liabilities claim on demand.
9See King (2013) or DeYoung and Jang (2016) for the weight on each class of the assets and liabilities.
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with less restricted fund access using pooled cash flows (Stein 1997)10. The internal liquidity
market works similarly. Carletti et al. (2007) argued that a merger affects banks liquidity
management. Banks demands for liquidity depend on uncertainty about deposit withdrawals
(Diamond and Dybvig 1983). Mergers change the distribution of liquidity shocks, resulting in
changes in liquidity needs. According to Carletti et al. (2007), there are two distinct effects of
mergers on funding liquidity, namely, funding liquidity effects. One is the diversification effect.
Mergers allow banks to diversify funding liquidity risk by pooling idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks. The opposite argument is the internalization effect. Mergers increase the marginal
value of each unit of liquidity holdings that can be used to meet withdrawals from any of the
banks in the same MBHC.
Therefore, the diversification effect indicates that MBHC members hold less liquidity
than non-MBHC banks because the expected liquidity needs are smaller than those of the
others. In contrast, the internalization effect indicates that an MBHC member holds more
liquidity than non-MBHC banks because liquidity is more valuable in the sense that the
MBHC member has an opportunity to use liquidity to meet the deposit outflow of other
members in the same MBHC. Hence, we postulate the following.
Hypothesis 1 (Diversification): MBHC members have lower NSFRs than non-MBHC
banks.
Hypothesis 2 (Internalization): MBHC members have higher NSFRs than non-MBHC
banks.
Our primary analysis investigates these two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 implies that MBHCs have scant liquidity and use it efficiently in their
internal liquidity markets. However, this hypothesis is also consistent with the “too-big-
to-fail” story. MBHC members find it unnecessary to have high liquidity because they are
10Stein (1997) argued that the internal capital market alleviates cash constraints and allows for more
efficient capital allocation. As noted in Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan et al. (2000), however,
inefficient internal capital markets can lead to excessive cross-divisional subsidies.
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confident that they are “too-big-to-fail”. Hypothesis 2 implies that MBHCs have abundant
liquidity in their internal liquidity markets. Entering an MBHC allows a bank to have access
to stable funding sources that the MBHC already has.
2.2. Funding costs
The third analysis complements the baseline. A bank can collect more stable funds
by offering higher deposit rates. In particular, such behaviour is remarkable at the onset
of a crisis, when deposit inflows into banks weaken (Acharya and Mora 2015)11. As the
deposit rate increases, the NSFR increases because its numerator, ASF, increases. That is,
the funding cost should be positively related to the NSFR based on its composition. The
following hypotheses complement the previous Hypothesis 1 or 2, whichever of the two holds,
as long as this positive relationship is found.
Hypothesis 3a: MBHC members raise deposits at lower costs than non-MBHC banks
when the diversification hypothesis holds.
Hypothesis 3b: MBHC members raise deposits at higher costs than non-MBHC banks
when the internalization hypothesis holds.
In other words, we predict that Hypothesis 3a holds when Hypothesis 1 holds and that
Hypothesis 3b holds when Hypothesis 2 holds. The former implies that an MBHCs funding
cost is lower than others because the MBHC member requires fewer stable funds. The latter
implies that an MBHCs funding cost is higher than others because the MBHC member
requires more stable funds. Several studies have documented the change in deposit rates
when banks experience M&As. Among them, Dinger (2015) found that merging banks are
more likely to change their deposit rates in the first months following a merger1213.
11However, Gatev and Strahan (2006) provided evidence that when liquidity dries up and commercial paper
spreads widen, banks experience funding inflows.
12Dinger (2015) examined the frequency of deposit-rate changes around the time of a merger and did not
mention the direction of changes.
13The internal capital market theory suggests that the creation of an internal capital market, in which
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2.3. Brother/sister effects on liquidity in MBHCs
When a new bank enters an MBHC, the funding liquidity risk changes within the MBHC.
As the number of members increases, the existing members can also diversify the risk of
withdrawals more efficiently and can value more highly the liquidity used for withdrawals in
other member banks. We call the funding liquidity effect of new entry on other members the
brother/sister effect. An example might be helpful to the readers. Figure 1 illustrates the
new entry method. Examining the (i) parent-subsidiary case, suppose that MBHC A had
members A1 and A2. When a new bank B1 enters MBHC A and becomes a member, this
new member is regarded as a newborn child in the family. B1 becomes a brother/sister of
A1 and A2. In this case, not only B1 but also A1 and A2 can enjoy the benefits of the more
efficient internal liquidity market14. In other words, A1 and A2 have brother/sister effects.
—————————————————————————
Figure 1
—————————————————————————
Accordingly, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 4a: If the diversification hypothesis holds, the other members of an MBHC
that has acquired a new member have lower NSFRs than other banks that experience no
mergers.
Hypothesis 4b: If the internalization hypothesis holds, the other members of an MBHC
that has acquired a new member have higher NSFRs than other banks that experience no
mergers.
the headquarters allocates capital across different projects, could limit the distortions arising from external
financing costs (Shin and Stulz 1998, Lamont 1997, Stein 1997). However, this theory is not the case in the
banking industry. Houston and James (1998) examined the relationship between organizational structure
and bank lending by comparing the lending behaviours of MBHC members and those of non-MBHC banks.
They found lower cash flow sensitivity for member banks, indicating that holding company affiliation reduces
the cost of raising funds externally. In such a case, non-MBHC banks face a higher cost of financing.
14The coinsurance effect was first introduced for mergers between U.S. conglomerates by Lewellen (1971).
He found that combining two or more firms with cash flows that are imperfectly correlated can reduce the
merged firms risk of default, hence increasing the debt capacity of the combined firm.
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Whichever hypothesis holds, we consider that the brother/sister effect depends on the
number of subsidiaries of the MBHC. Along with the theoretical argument in Carletti et al.
(2007), the internalization effect and the diversification effect are naturally strengthened by
increasing the number of members of an MBHC. However, we have no reason to determine
the range of the number at which the former effect dominates the latter. For this reason, we
consider a U-shaped or an inverted U-shaped relationship. A U-shaped relationship indicates
that the internalization overweighs the diversification when the number of members is large,
while the diversification overweighs the internalization when the number of members is small.
The inverted U-shaped relationship indicates the opposite. In this regard, the fifth hypothesis
becomes the following.
Hypothesis 5a: The funding liquidity effect of a new entry/exit on NSFRs of the other
members exhibits a U-shaped relationship.
Hypothesis 5b: The funding liquidity effect of a new entry/exit on NSFRs of the other
members exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship.
2.4. New entry types: Parents remarriage and the son/daughters marriage
MBHCs employ several methods to change their structure: (i) parent-subsidiary mergers;
(ii) subsidiary-subsidiary mergers; and (iii) parent-parent mergers. Figure 1 illustrates these
three methods. Suppose that MBHC A had two subsidiaries A1 and A2. There is a target
bank B1, which might or might not be a subsidiary of another BHC B. To acquire the target,
the MBHC can force A2 to acquire or merge with the target B1, which is a subsidiary-
subsidiary merger. The second option to acquire the target is that MBHC A directly acquires
the target B1 by purchasing its equity stocks, which is a parent-subsidiary merger. If the
target is a subsidiary of a BHC, the third option is available. Parent A acquires or merges
with parent B, which is a parent-parent merger15. From the viewpoint of the liquidity theory
15B1 is a newcomer both in (ii) subsidiary-subsidiary mergers and (iii) parent-parent mergers. In (i)
parent-subsidiary mergers, B1 disappears. However, A2 inherits the funding liquidity risk of B1.
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of Carletti et al. (2007), these three types of mergers produce the same results regarding
MBHCs funding liquidity risk16.
Therefore, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 6: In each of the three methods of new entry, the internalization or diversifi-
cation effect emerges as its result.
3. Data, variables, and methodology
3.1. Sample data
We use quarterly data from U.S. commercial banks from 1995:Q1 to 2011:Q4. The data
sources are the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council call reports). We obtain bank-level and BHC-level M&A data from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. We excluded 36 M&A deals from among 4,045 BHC-
level M&A deals for a technical reason17. The calculation of the NSFR requires detailed
information on the items held by BHCs. Since the call reports changed the definitions of
items disclosed, we cannot trace the data after 2011:Q418.
3.2. Variables
Deyoung and Jang (2016) find that U.S. banks actively manage their liquidity. When
banks successful circumvent the new regulation through some types of liquidity arbitrage,
banks could reduce their required stable funding and operate with fewer expensive stable
16Cremers et al. (2011) found that capital allocations from the headquarters in the banking group com-
pensate for deposit shortfalls at the bank level, suggesting that the effect of parent-parent mergers is the
same as the effect of subsidiary-subsidiary mergers in that the number of subsidiaries decreases. However,
diversification at the parent level enhances parents ability to obtain better external financing deals to enrich
the internal financing available to their subsidiaries, thereby increasing the ability of the parent to relieve the
financial difficulties faced by their subsidiaries.
17Some BHCs merged with or acquired other BHCs more than once during a quarter. Since our balance
sheet data are quarterly, it is necessary to break down the M&A data into quarterly data to create quarterly
M&A variables, thus maintaining consistency.
18See Appendix A of DeYoung and Jang (2016) for items used to calculate the NSFR.
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funds. Since their study is in line with our objective of this paper, we aim to study whether
M&A is a typical type of liquidity arbitrage that non-MBHC banks attempt to join the MBHC
structure to benefit from lower liquidity holding. Therefore, we find that the determinants
of the NSFR in DeYoung and Jang (2016) are important to our study. In this regard, we
follow DeYoung and Jang (2016) and use Assets, Capital, Growthplan, Public, Mortgages,
and Commitments as the determinants of the NSFR. The definitions of the variables are
provided in Appendix Table A1. Bank size is measured by Assets, defined as the log of total
assets. As the bank size becomes larger, we expect that the banks are easily able to solve
the liquidity risk by selling large brokered deposits or by liquidating marketable loans, such
as syndicated loans. Capital is defined as book equity (common equity, preferred equity, and
subordinated notes) as a percentage of total assets. As the bank is better capitalized, it has
greater debt capacity and can afford to absorb the liquidity shock more easily.
Growthplan is defined as the inflation-adjusted internal asset growth rate (net of acquisi-
tions) over the next two years. Fast-growing banks have lower NSFRs because it is difficult
to fund rapid asset or loan growth by raising new stable funds. Public is a dummy variable,
which equals one when a bank or its holding company is publicly traded, and zero other-
wise. The listed banks are expected to have faster and less expensive access to sources of
liquidity. Mortgages is 1–4 family mortgage loans as a percentage of total loans. Since such
residential mortgage loans have long durations, the bank must mitigate the risks of maturity
mismatches between the asset and liability sides. As the proportion of Mortgages increases,
the bank is expected to choose a higher NSFR. Commitments is unused loan commitments
as a percentage of total assets. As the proportion increases, the bank is expected to have a
lower NSFR, all else being equal.
We consider several other variables. As argued by Carletti et al. (2007), the internaliza-
tion effect dominates if the cost of refinancing is low, while the diversification effect dominates
when it is high. Accordingly, we measure the cost of refinancing by Fundingcost, defined as
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deposit funding cost per total deposits. Additionally, we control for Deposit, measured by
total deposits divided by total assets. We control for a measurement of income diversification,
Incomediv, defined as non-interest income divided by operating income because the business
mix of banks affects their illiquidity ratios.
We expect that MBHCs can diversify the funding liquidity risk more by obtaining funds
from different regions. If two banks are subsidiaries of the same MBHC in a different state,
each might have different liquidity shocks19. From this viewpoint, we control for several
state-level economic conditions. GDPgrowth, Unemployment, and Inflation represents basic
macroeconomic conditions of the state. The house price index (HPI ) measures aggregate
demand for mortgage loans and commercial and industrial loans. Branches is the number of
branches as a percentage of assets (in million dollars). HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
for deposits. These two variables measure the competitiveness of deposit markets in a state.
Finally, Failure is the frequency of bank failures in a state. As this rate increases, a distressed
bank is more likely to be acquired. The data sources are the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation for Branches, HHI and Failure, the U.S. Census Bureau for GDPgrowth and
Inflation, the Federal Housing Finance Agency for HPI, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics
for Unemployment.
3.3. Summary statistics
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for two sub-samples of non-MBHC banks and MBHC
members during the period from 1995 to 2011. Non-MBHC banks comprise stand-alone banks
and subsidiary banks of single-bank holding companies. Each observation is counted as a
bank-quarter. To remove outliers, all of the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
percentiles. The last column presents the t-test for the equality of means across sub-samples.
The statistics are significant at the 1% level for all of the variables except for Fundingcosts.
19Hughes et al. (1999) and Deng and Elyasiani (2008) found that MBHCs operate in distant geographic
horizons.
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In particular, non-MBHC banks have a higher NSFR, a smaller size, a higher growth plan, a
higher mortgage, a smaller commitment, and a smaller proportion of income diversification
but higher deposits than MBHC members.
———————————————————————————————
Table 1
———————————————————————————————
3.4. Matching method
To test the hypotheses previously mentioned, we need to identify the differences in funding
liquidity effects between MBHC members and non-MBHC banks. This section explains how
we use the matching method to identify the funding liquidity effects in the baseline estimation.
The method comprises the following four steps.
Step 1: We define treatment group and control group in the baseline analysis. The treated
group comprises Changer, which is a bank that was not initially a member and entered MBHC
during the sample period. The control group comprises non-MBHC bank, which has never
belonged to MBHCs throughout the period. An indicator variable Dit takes one when the
bank i belongs to the treated group at period t, and zero otherwise.
Step 2: We estimate propensity score by yearly probit estimation. Unlike experimental
studies where a random assignment of treatment guarantees that each unit has the same
likelihood of treatment ex-ante, the selection bias due to observable/unobservable differences
between the treated and control should be corrected(Dehejia and Wahba 2002, Smith and
Todd 2005). The propensity score p̂it is estimated by probit equation as
Pr(Dit = 1) = Φ
(∑K
k=1
γ̂kx
k
i,t−1
)
≡ p̂it (1)
for each period t. Φ is a cumulative normal distribution function and γ̂k is the estimated
coefficient of k-th control variable xki,t−1. Since it is necessary that the control variables should
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not be affected by the treatment, we take at least one lag for all the control variables.
Step 3: We match a bank belonging to the treated group with a bank belonging to
the control group one by one, using nearest-neighbour propensity score matching (PSM)
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) or the kernel matching method (Heckman et al. 1998a).
Step 4: We consider average treatment effects of a new entry into an MBHC on the
treated. An indicator variable s is defined to denote pre-treatment period and post-treatment
period. s = 0 denotes pre-treatment period and s = 1 post-treatment period, respectively.
From the definition of our treatment and control group, Di0 = 0 for both groups, Di1 = 1
for the treatment group, and Di0 = 0 for the control group. To simplify the notation, we
represent the indicator variable as Ds omitting the subscript i when possible. In addition,
we denote the outcome variable NSFR by ys without subscript i. Let y
0
1 be the outcome
without treatment and y11 be the outcome with treatment.
If we assume conditional mean independence
E(y01|x,D1) = E(y01|x) and E(y11|x,D1) = E(y11|x), (2)
the effect of the treatment on the treated becomes
E(y11 − y01|x,D1 = 1) = E(y11 − y01|x). (3)
The conditional mean independence assumption, which is sometimes called the unconfound-
edness assumption, assumes away potential bias arising from the selection on observables
(Imbens 2004, Smith and Todd 2005). It means that once conditioning on covariates x,
the treatment produces no systematic differences in outcomes attributable to the treatment
effect.
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If we further assume an overlapping condition 20
0 < Pr(D1 = 1|x) < 1 (4)
for all x, the average treatment effect on the treated(ATT) becomes
ATT = E
(
(D1 − p(x)) y1
1− p(x)
)
1
Pr(D1 = 1)
(5)
where p(x) = Pr(D1 = 1|x) is propensity score. The matching estimator of ATT is
ATT1 =
1
N
∑
i:Di1=1
(
yi1 −
∑
j∈Ci
wijy
0
i1
)
(6)
where wij is a weight for j-th bank matched with i in the comparison group Ci, and N is
the number of treated banks21. We use matching on the propensity score (Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1983)22. When we use the one-nearest-neighbour matching with propensity score,
wij′ = 1 only for the nearest neighbour j
′ and wij = 0 for other j 6= j′. The comparison
group Ci is restricted to the set that the calliper, i.e., the maximum distance at which two
observations are far from each other, is 0.01. When we use the kernel matching estimator,
20This assumption means that there should be a positive probability of either entering MBHC (D1 = 1)
or not (D1 = 0), which ensures the existence of potential matches for each Changer among non-MBHC
banks. This assumption is sometimes called common support. When this assumption is satisfied, matching
eliminates the bias arising from the differences in the supports of covariates between the treated and controls
and the bias arising from the differences in the distributions of covariates between the two groups in the
common support(Heckman et al. 1998b).
21Such a counterfactual framework mitigates the issue of selection bias when we estimate the NSFR in
a usual parametric outcome regression. Let it be an individual transitory shock in the regression. Then,
a sufficient condition for identification is that selection for treatment does not depend on the individual
transitory shocks. That is, Pr(Di1 = 1|it) = Pr(Di1 = 1). If this holds, we have E(Di1it) = 0 so that we
can estimate the outcome regression equation. However, if that equation does not hold, i.e., the treatment
variable is correlated with the error in the outcome equation, selection bias arises so that we cannot identify
the outcome equation. The assumption of conditional mean independence essentially rules out confounding
due to this correlation.
22PSM avoids the curse of dimensionality.
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the weight is calculated using kernel function K as wij = K(pi − pj)/
∑
j:Di1=0
K(pi − pj),
and the comparison group is the same across i, Ci = {j : Di1 = 0}.
3.5. Alternative average treatment effects
In our definition of the treated and control groups, we have E(y00|x,D1 = 1) = E(y00|x)
because Di0 = 0 for both groups. Since Eq. (2) implies
E(y11 − y01|x,D1) = E(y11 − y01|x) (7)
under our construction of the sample, then Eq. (3) is easily expressed as
E((y11 − y00)− (y01 − y00)|x,D1 = 1) = E(∆y1 −∆y0|x) (8)
where ∆y1 = y11 − y00 and ∆y0 = y01 − y00. These two differences are changes from the pre-
treatment to post-treatment for the treated and the control, respectively. Therefore, this can
be seen the difference-in-difference estimator, and its sample ATT is
ATT2 =
1
N
∑
i:Di1=1
(
∆yi1 −
∑
j∈Ci
wij∆y
0
i1
)
(9)
An alternative approach is proposed by Abadie (2005). Instead of Eq. (2), we assume
E
(
y01 − y00|x,D1
)
= E
(
y01 − y00|x
)
(10)
It states that conditional on the covariates, the average NSFR for treated and controls would
have followed parallel paths in absence of the treatment. This assumption reduces to selection
on observables restriction
E
(
y01|x,D1 = 1
)
= E
(
y01|x,D1 = 0
)
(11)
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under our construction that D0 = 0 and E(y
0
0|x,D) = E(y00|x) for all banks. Together
with the overlapping assumption, the consistent estimator of the average treatment effect
E(y11 − y01|x,D1 = 1) becomes
ATT3 = (ρN)
−1∑N
i=1
(Di1 − p̂i1)∆yi
1− p̂i1 (12)
where ρ is the fraction of the treated, and ∆yi = yi1 − yi0 is the observed difference of the
NSFR.
For the robustness, we pick up the first-time changer from a group of Changer 23. This is
identified as the bank that enters MBHC for the first time and remains a member during the
sample period among Changer. Restricting to the First-time changer excludes the possibility
that the bank in the treated group is different from the bank in the control group before the
treatment. Once entering MBHC and exiting afterwards, banks may have net stable funding
and/or covariates different from that of the bank staying at MBHC. In particular, if the past
NSFR affects the decision to enter MBHC, the effects of the entering MBHC on the NSFR
may be different between the banks that were previously MBHC members and the banks
that have not been.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Funding liquidity effects of new entry into MBHCs: Baseline analysis
We use the matching method to identify the differences in funding liquidity effects between
MBHC members and non-MBHC banks. In the baseline analysis, we examine three types
for the treatment group: Changer, First-time changer, or Repeater. Changer is a bank that
was not initially a member and that entered the MBHC at the time of the sample period.
First-time changer is identified as a bank that enters MBHC for the first time and remains a
23Casu et al. (2013) examine the first-time treatment for the reason described below.
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member during the period24. Repeater is a bank that repeatedly joined and left the MBHC
structure during the observable period. The control group comprises non-MBHC banks that
never belonged to MBHCs throughout the period. Table 2 reports the frequency distribution
of the treatment groups. There are 1,497 observations belonging to Changer. Among them,
857 observations are First-time changers. The remaining 647 observations are Repeaters.
—————————————————————————
Table 2
—————————————————————————
We match the treated with the controls, using nearest-neighbour PSM or kernel match-
ing25. Table 3 indicates our main results. The estimated average treatment effect of entering
an MBHC on those banks that actually entered is the difference in the outcome variable
between the treated and controls. The treatment group is Changer in columns (i) to (iv). It
is First-time changer in columns (v) to (vii) and is Repeater in column (viii). The outcome
variable is either the NSFR or its difference, denoted DNSFR . The matching method is
nearest-neighbour PSM, kernel matching, or Abadies method (Abadie 2005)26. In models
9 to 16, we include the previous NSFR as a covariate because lower liquidity might be the
reason for the bank to enter the MBHC (Almeida et al. 2011)27.
The estimated ATTs are significantly negative for all of the models. Therefore, we can
24Once entering an MBHC and exiting afterwards, banks might have net stable funding and/or covariates
different from those of banks remaining in the MBHC. In particular, if the past NSFR affects the decision to
enter the MBHC, the effects of entering the MBHC on the NSFR could be different between the banks that
were previously MBHC members and the banks that were not.
25Our matching method is valid. Figure A3, Appendix Table A2 and Appendix Table A4 will be provided
upon request from the authors as appendices. Figure A3 shows the estimated distribution of the propensity
score by the kernel density method, indicating that the two distributions for treated and controls are almost
similar, but that of the unmatched is quite different from the others. Appendix Table A2 reports the t-test
results for each covariate, indicating no significant differences in any of the covariates or the two treatment
groups. The balancing condition is satisfied regardless of the group that is considered treated.
26In the appendix, we explain the difference in Abadies method from the usual PSM.
27Almeida et al. (2011) theoretically showed that financially distressed firms are acquired by liquid firms in
their industries, even in the absence of operational synergies. They call these transactions “liquidity mergers”
since their purpose is to reallocate liquidity to firms that are otherwise inefficiently terminated.
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conclude that entering the MBHC caused a lower NSFR, conditional on that the bank actually
entered an MBHC, even if we consider selection bias. The results support Hypothesis 1. The
diversification effect dominates internalization effects. MBHCs create their internal markets
to exchange their liquidity needs. Therefore, MBHC members dispense with holding more
liquidity than non-MBHC banks because the expected liquidity needs are smaller than those
of the others. However, the estimated ATTs seem economically small.
The results do not change whether we include the previous NSFR, which could be a
potential reason for selection bias, as a covariate. As we discussed earlier, if the previous
NSFR truly affects the decision to enter an MBHC and if we include the previous NSFR
as a covariate, potential selection bias can arise. This inclusion does not change the ATTs
much in any column. In addition, the matching methods do not produce different results.
Furthermore, our results are robust to the subsample of First-time changers and Repeaters.
—————————————————————————
Table 3
—————————————————————————
4.2. Robustness test
The previous estimation examines the difference in the NSFR only one quarter after new
entry. Calomiris (1999) suggested that the timing of the realization of gains from consol-
idation is important to constructing a proper counterfactual. He argued that gains from
mergers could continue to accrue a couple of years after the merger occurred, or the costs
outweigh the benefits of the merger in the first two years after the merger. In our context,
the significant liquidity effect in the previous table might be due to the temporary reasons for
mergers. Therefore, our second analysis examines whether the diversification effect persists
for at least one or two years. The upper panel of Table 4 reports the estimated ATTs after
one year, and the lower panel presents ATTs after two years. The results are almost identical
to those in Table 3. The diversification effect persists over one or two years, and there is an
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increasing tendency over the period after the merger. The gains of liquidity from mergers
continue to accrue for at least two years after the merger.
———————————————————————————————
Table 4
———————————————————————————————
Additionally, our results are robust to an alternative measurement of liquidity: the tra-
ditional loans-to-core deposits (LTCD) ratio (DeYoung and Jang 2016). Note that LTCD is
higher when funding liquidity risk is higher, indicating movement in an opposite direction
from the NSFR. As shown in models 5, 6, 11, and 12, the estimated average treatment effects
are not significant for one year while the effects become significantly positive after two years.
4.3. Funding costs
Since the first analysis provides evidence for the diversification effect, the second analysis
tests Hypothesis 3a. Table 5 reports the results of the estimated ATTs of funding costs. All
of the estimated ATTs are significantly negative. The t-statistics are very high. The results
support Hypothesis 3a. By entering an MBHC, the bank can afford to save funding costs
because it requires fewer stable funds than before. The funding cost is positively related to
the NSFR when a bank enters an MBHC. The result that entering an MBHC allows a bank
to have a higher NSFR and lower funding costs because it enables the entrant to have access
to the stable funding sources that the MBHC already has is non-intuitive28.
———————————————————————————————
Table 5
———————————————————————————————
28Additionally, the second result is along the lines of the evidence provided by Cremers et al. (2011) that
the headquarters offer deposit smoothing to member banks in the banking group.
21
4.4. Funding liquidity effects of new entry into MBHCs: Brother/sister effects
So far, we have analysed the funding liquidity effects of new members entries into an
MBHC. The third analysis investigates the brother/sister effects of a new entry. We consider
two treatment groups: the Increase group and Decrease group. When an existing bank
experiences a new entry into its MBHC, and the number of members of this MBHC increases,
the existing banks in this MBHC belong to the Increase group. Formally, the dummy variable
Dit equals one if the existing bank i experiences an increase in the number of members, and
zero otherwise. When an existing bank experiences an exit from its MBHC and the number
of members decreases, the banks in this MBHC belong to the Decrease group. Formally,
the dummy variable Dit equals one if the bank i experiences a decrease in the number of
members, and zero otherwise.
Table 6 reports the estimated average treatment effects on the treated of experiencing
new entry or exit. For the Increase treatment group, the differences are significantly neg-
ative in both model 1 and model 3. For the Decrease treatment group, the differences are
significantly positive in models 2 and 4. The evidence supports Hypothesis 4a. The diversifi-
cation effect dominates the internalization effect when the number of members changes. The
NSFR decreases when a newcomer enters and increases when the existing bank exits from
the MBHC.
———————————————————————————————
Table 6
———————————————————————————————
4.5. U-shaped relationship
As highlighted by Cetorelli et al. (2014), BHCs have not only grown in size but also
have become substantially more complex. The Federal Reserve Board is proposing NSFR
requirements tailored to more complex BHCs. Federal Register (2016) argued that the threat
to U.S. financial stability is mainly due to an unstable funding profile of complex BHCs. As
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mentioned earlier, our analysis is motivated by more complex BHCs perhaps facing challenges
in liquidity risk management. For this reason, we enrich the above analysis by omitting the
simplified assumptions.
The above analysis simplified the analysis by implicitly assuming that the funding liquid-
ity effect does not depend on the number of members. However, as the previous argument
suggests, if the number of members affects the liquidity held by existing members, they might
have lower(higher) NSFRs as the number of members increases(decreases). The previous Ta-
ble 2 reports the distribution of the number of members of MBHCs. A large number of
MBHCs have two or three members. Additionally, there are many MBHCs with more than
10 members.
To test Hypothesis 5, the fourth analysis uses a regression approach. We specify the
NSFR as
NSFRit = αt+ β(Nit)Dit +
∑K
k=1
γkX
k
i,t−1 + λt + ci + it (13)
A time-specific component is denoted by λt, an individual-specific component by ci, and an
individual transitory shock by it, which has a mean of zero at each t. X
k
i,t−1 represents
the control variables. The dummy variable Dit takes 1 if the number of members changes
(Increase or Decrease). Nit is a log of number of members
29. The coefficient β(Nit) is assumed
to be a quadratic function β1Nit + β2N
2
it, including linear case.
The estimation method is a first-differenced estimation with time as a fixed effect. We
difference the above equation to obtain
∆NSFRit = α + (β1Nit + β2N
2
it)∆Dit +
∑K
k=1
γk∆X
k
i,t−1 + ηt + νit (14)
where ηt = λt−λt−1 and νit = it− i,t−1. If we assume the strict exogeneity E(∆Ditνit) = 0,
29We take log because the distribution of the number of subsidiaries is highly skewed.
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the above equation can be estimated by OLS with time fixed effects, which is the first-
differenced estimator.
We exclude the observations that enter MBHCs by themselves for reasons of selectivity
bias. We also exclude observations with numbers of subsidiaries that do not change, that
is, if they experience the same numbers of entries and exits, because the effect might be
ambiguous.
Table 7 reports the results of estimation. In model 1, in which both dummies are included,
the β coefficients are significant. Model 2 drops the Decrease group, and model 3 drops
the Increase group. Additionally, in these two models, the β coefficients are still significant.
These three models consistently indicate that the NSFR is U-shaped with respect to Increase
and has an inverted U-shape with respect to Decrease. Hypothesis 5a is supported by this
result.
At the bottom of the table, we report the slopes of dummies evaluated at the mean,
minimum, and maximum of the number of members. We can see that the slope for Increase
is negative at the minimum and is positive at the maximum. The slope for Decrease is
positive at the minimum and is negative at the maximum. Since the dummy equals positive
one when the number of members is decreasing, these two slopes for Increase and Decrease are
consistent with each other. In other words, the diversification effect dominates internalization
when the number of members is small, while internalization dominates when the number of
members increases. The complex MBHCs that have a large number of members manage
liquidity very differently from the MBHCs that have relatively simple structures.
Across four models, the Fundingcosts coefficient is negative and significant at the 1%
level. Growthplan is negatively associated with the NSFR, indicating that rapidly growing
banks target lower NSFRs. The significantly positive coefficient of Mortgages indicates that
when residential mortgages are an important line of a lending business, banks tend to increase
their liquidity to eliminate their interest rate risk. Banks that invest in loan commitment
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activities tend to reduce their NSFR. The coefficient of Incomediv is insignificant. Banks
with higher deposits are more likely to reduce their holdings in the NSFR.
———————————————————————————————
Table 7
———————————————————————————————
4.6. Method of entry: Parental effect
The last analysis aims at testing Hypothesis 6. The four treatment groups are defined
as the subsample of the baseline analysis. The SUB-SUB group comprises members that
acquired outside banks. The PAR-SUB group comprises members that were acquired by a
parent BHC. The PAR-PAR1 group comprises banks with parent BHCs that were acquired
by other BHCs. The PAR-PAR2 group comprises members whose parent BHC acquired
other BHCs. Note that in subsidiary-subsidiary M&As, since the targets disappear after
M&As, we include only the acquirers30.
———————————————————————————————
Table 8
———————————————————————————————
Table 8 presents our findings. There are significantly negative differences for all four
treatment groups. The evidence supports Hypothesis 6. Whichever type of merger the BHC
chooses, the diversification effect appears after the merger.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents a comprehensive study of how an MBHC manages funding liquidity
risk through its internal liquidity market and the funding liquidity effect of new entry into the
30In addition, note that in parent-parent M&As, the effect resembles the brother/sister effect in the sense
that the subsidiary itself experiences no M&A.
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MBHC through the brother/sister and parental effects. We conduct our empirical analysis
using quarterly U.S. commercial banks data from 1995:Q1 to 2011:Q4. The internal markets
provide entrants with benefits of efficient allocation of funding liquidity risks. The banks in
MBHCs allocate scant liquidity efficiently to each other and increase their deposits at low
costs.
Our study contributes to the understanding and makes some recommendations for de-
positors, investors, academic researchers and regulators as follows. First, we find that the
diversification effect dominates the internalization effect in the internal liquidity markets of
MBHCs. MBHC members hold less liquidity than non-MBHC banks because the expected
liquidity needs are smaller than those of the others. Our evidence shows that by entering
an MBHC, the bank can afford to save funding costs because it requires fewer stable funds
than before. Therefore, we would suggest depositors and/or regulators to check the funding
liquidity risk of this structure carefully. In addition, depositors of MBHC banks could not
earn high interest rates compared to those of non-MBHC banks.
Second, the findings related to the brother/sister effect suggest that the NSFR becomes
lower when a newcomer enters and higher when an existing bank exits from the MBHC. In-
terestingly, the diversification effect dominates internalization when the number of members
is small, whereas internalization dominates when the number of members increases. This
evidence contributes to deeper understanding of the MBHC structure in that complex MB-
HCs holding a large number of members manage liquidity very differently from MBHCs with
relatively simpler structures. Our study has highlighted the instability of large MBHC struc-
ture. The investors increasingly become aware of the efficiency of their investment portfolios
between simple MBHCs and complex MBHCs, depending on their risk preference.
Third, we extend our analysis to different entry types: (i) parent-subsidiary mergers; (ii)
subsidiary-subsidiary mergers; and (iii) parent-parent mergers. We find consistent results
that regardless of the type of merger that the BHC chooses, the diversification effect appears
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after the merger. In line with our initial attempt, a merger is regarded as an observable
factor of BHCs risk that the relevant academic researchers could apply to their studies.
Fourth, our study has presented the observable trend of joining the MBHC structure in
order to benefit from holding lower liquidity and raise deposits at lower costs up to 201131.
However, our paper shows a shortcoming on the data sample period that limits the readers
the observation in the recent years.
Given the ever-increasing systemic importance of BHCs, it is difficult for an outsider to
distinguish between the risks arising from this complex structure. Apparently, more than
500 failed banks have been recorded from the peak of the crisis in 2007 to the early period
of 201632. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate the reasons why the banks failed and create
pressure on the role of the regulators. As of the first implementation in 2021, the regulator
should be aware that the regulatory burden of Basel III NSFR regulations might be more
harmful to MBHCs than to non-MBHCs. These regulations distort the working of internal
liquidity markets in the MBHCs. Internal liquidity markets are particularly important during
the period when external liquidity markets do not work.
Since deregulation, the environments in which stand-alone banks and BHC affiliates exist
have undergone many changes, e.g., under more competitive pressure from other types of
finance institutions such as finance companies, brokerage firms, and money market mutual
funds. The need for further research into the inherent risks of finance companies, brokerage
firms or money market mutual funds has been highlighted, in particular for financial holding
companies. Further investigation is needed in other countries, such as Japan, where the
business group is well developed, therefore contributing to the Basel III regulatory debate
for the regulatory context in Asia.
31As indicated in Ly et al. (2017b), there is a high M&A trend until 2012.
32The failed bank list can be found from https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individua l/failed /banklist.html.
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